The security of AES-192 against multiple impossible differentials attack is studied in this paper. Based on two types of impossible differentials for 4-round AES, two 7-round attack trails of AES-192 with the same plaintext and ciphertext difference structure are proposed. A new optimum combination of these two attack trails is applied in our attack so that the plaintext pairs can be reused and data complexity can be reduced. Furthermore, this new optimum combination also can reduce the time complexity in the master key recovering phase. Our attack can also reduce the number of subkeys by key schedule considerations. For each attack trail, only 15-byte subkeys need to be guessed. Combined with the master key recovering technique based on the key schedule algorithm, the early abort technique for plaintext pairs, and the sieve method for plaintext pairs based on quick sort etc., we have obtained the best result so far in terms of time complexity for impossible differential cryptanalysis of AES-192. The time, memory, and data complexities are 2 109.2 7-round AES encryptions, 2 86.5 bytes and 2 106.3 chosen plaintexts, respectively. , multiple impossible differentials, block cipher, master key recovering technique, cryptanalysis.
I. INTRODUCTION
The Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) [1] , which supports 128-bit block size with variable key length (128, 192 and 256 bits), was chosen by NIST from fifteen candidate algorithms and selected as a standard in 2001. Since the importance of AES, it is quiet necessary to evaluate its sustained security. Due to AES s cryptanalytic resistance, the reduced cipher variants are studied and proposed by cryptanalysts in order to have a better understanding of full AES. In this paper, we study the security of 7-round AES-192 against multiple impossible differentials attack. Impossible differential attack [2] is a significant method in cryptanalysis for block ciphers. The first phase is to build one or more differentials whose probabilities are zero, then utilize them to obtain the correct key by discarding all the wrong ones. In 2008, Tsunoo et al. [3] proposed multiple impossible differentials which were applied to CLEFIA. They used a set of impossible differentials simultaneously to reduce time complexity. As a powerful attack for AES, several good results have been received for AES-192. In [4] ,
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Phan proposed an impossible differential attack on 7-round AES-192 which needs to guess 20 subkey bytes. In [5] , Zhang et al. found that 17 guessed subkey bytes are enough for the Phan's attack, hence the time complexity of the original attack can be reduced. After that, based on the same attack in [4] , [5] , Lu et al. [6] used additional technique (i.e. early abort and key schedule considerations) to reduce time and data complexities, obtaining the best result in terms of time complexity for impossible differential attack on AES-192 until now.
The motivation behind such study is to evaluate the security of AES-192 against multiple impossible differentials attack. We find two attack trails which can reduce the number of subkey bytes. Furthermore, the new interesting combination of these two trails can be applied so that the data and time complexities can be reduced. This optimum combination give a new interesting example of multiple attack trails, and shed more light on the multiple impossible differentials attack.
In paper [3] , [7] , these multiple attack trails have different plaintext or ciphertext difference, so the attacks have to select multiple types of structure in order to meet these differences. Different from preceding attacks, we construct two 7-round impossible differential attack trails with the same plaintext VOLUME 7, 2019 This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 License. For more information, see http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ and ciphertext difference. Though we use two attack trails, only one type of plaintext pairs structure needs to select. Not only the time complexity of selecting plaintext pairs can be reduced, but also the selected pairs can be reused in our attack, so the data complexity can be decreased. Furthermore, These two attack trails are delicate. Since the two attack trails exactly contain eight subkeys in the two middle columns, the number of subkeys can be reduced by the key schedule considerations. For each attack trail, only 15-byte subkeys need to be attacked. Using this new optimum combination of these two attack trails, we additionally can reduce the time complexity in the master key recovering phase. Namely, for each attack trail in this paper, ten master key bytes can be got. When using this optimum combination, we can not only obtain another two master key bytes in the second column, but also two more master key bytes by key schedule considerations. So in the master key recovering phase, the number of known master key bytes increases from ten to fourteen, which can improve the result. We use various techniques to reduce the time complexity greatly, including the early abort technique for plaintext pairs [8] , the sieve method for plaintext pairs [9] and so on. Although our attack is not the best attack on AES-192, it has the lowest computational cost among all impossible differential cryptanalysis of AES-192 known so far. Table I is the comparison of some attacks on AES-192. Organization: This paper is organized as follows. Section II briefly describes AES and provides the notations adopted in this paper. Two types of 4-round impossible differentials are constructed in Section III. Section IV presents our multiple impossible differentials attack on 7-round AES-192 with various techniques. Section V concludes this paper.
II. PRELIMINARIES A. DESCRIPTION OF AES
The block cipher AES is a 128-bit substitution-permutations network model and the numbers of the round are 10/12/14 corresponding to the keys of 128/192/256 bits respectively. The plaintext, the ciphertext and the internal state of AES are treated as a 4 × 4 matrix over the finite field GF(2 8 ) . An AES round is shown in Fig.1 , which applies four operations as follows:
(1)SubBytes(SB): This operation applies the same byte-wise invertible S-box on each byte of the state.
(2)ShiftRows(SR): This operation is a linear transformation, which rotates the j-th row of the 4 × 4 matrix to the left by j bytes for j = 0, 1, 2, 3.
(3)MixColumns(MC): Another linear transformation which is a multiplication by a matrix over GF (2 8 ) applies to each column.
(4) AddRoundKey(AK): This operation includes an XOR with the round subkeys which are derived from a master key.
In the first round, an extra whitening AK operation is applied, and the MC operation is omitted in the last round. Now we describe the key schedule algorithm of AES-192. The 192-bit master key is divided into six 32-bit [4] , W [5] ). In order to get the 13-round subkeys with four words each, the following procedure is used: 
B. NOTATIONS
Some notations are given as follows: (p,...,r) : the intermediate values of the p th , · · · , r th bytes after the SB/SR/MC/AK of i-th round x:
the difference of x and x k i, (p,...,r) :
the values of p th , · · · , r th subkey bytes of i-th round
the j-th column of x i , j = 0, 1, 2, 3
In this paper, we denote the whitening key as k 0 and the rounds of AES-192 are numbered 1, · · · , 12 . 
III. 4-ROUND IMPOSSIBLE DIFFERENTIALS OF AES
We use the 4-round impossible differential property which was proposed by Biham in [10] . The property states that if the input difference x I i only has one non-zero byte, we cannot have the corresponding difference x SR i+3,SR(col(j)) = 0, j = 0, 1, 2, 3. Based on this property, we find two types of 4-round impossible differentials of AES, and one of the 4-round differentials is shown in Fig.2 .
Each type of differential has four different input differences and four different output differences. The positions of nonzero input and output difference bytes are shown in table II. We conclude x I 4 = 0 from the output difference, and conclude x AK 3,col(i−1) = 0 from the i-th row in each type of input difference, which are contradicted each other.
IV. A MULTIPLE IMPOSSIBLE DIFFERENTIALS ATTACK ON 7-ROUND AES-192
Based on the two types of 4-round impossible differentials with two rounds extended at the beginning and one round added at the end, a multiple impossible differentials attack on 7-round AES-192 is presented. As shown in Fig.3 , for each attack trail, sixteen subkey bytes (k 0, (2, 3, 4, 7, 8, 9, 13, 14) , k 1, (4, 6, 9, 11) , k 7,(0,7,10,13) ) and (k 0, (2, 3, 4, 7, 8, 9, 13, 14) , k 1, (5, 7, 8, 10) , k 7,(0,7,10,13) ) need to be attacked, respectively. These two trails have the same subkey bytes of whitening keys k 0 and 7-th round subkey k 7 but different subkey bytes of first round subkey k 1 . Using the key schedule considerations, k 1,(10) = k 0,(2) ⊕ SB(k 1, (7) ) ⊕ a and k 1,(11) = k 0,(3) ⊕ SB(k 1,(4) ) ⊕ a can be derived (where a and a are constants), so only 15-byte subkeys need to be guessed for each attack trail. Because the same subkey bytes of whitening key k 0 and 7-th subkey k 7 are attacked, the number of wrong subkeys of (k 0, (2, 3, 4, 7, 8, 9, 13, 14) , k 7,(0,7,10,13) ) can be reduced after sieving through the first attack trail. Therefore, the time complexity of the second attack trail can be neglected compared with the time complexity of the first attack trail. Futhermore, because two attack trails have the same plaintext and ciphertext structure, our attack reuses the plaintext pairs to sieve the wrong subkeys, which can reduce the data complexity. Combined with a series of additional techniques, our attack greatly reduces the time complexity for impossible differential attack of AES-192.
A. THE PROCEDURE OF 7-ROUND ATTACK ON AES-192
The procedure can be divided into three phases:
The following precomputed tables are used to extract round subkeys. Table 0 : Let S denote the byte-wise S-box of AES, in and out denote the input and output difference of S-box. When in and out are non-zero bytes, the equation S(x) ⊕ S(x ⊕ in ) = out has one solution on average. Table 0 stores calculated x indexed by 2 16 possible values of ( in , out ). Table 1 : For 4(2 8 − 1) possible values of difference x with only one nonzero byte, we compute and store MC( x) in table 1 , which are all possible values of x I 7,(col(0)) satisfying the expected difference of our attack. Table 1 should be used to attack subkeys k 7,(0,7,10,13) . Table 2 : we compute all (x 0 , y 2 , (4, 6, 9, 11) satisfying the expected difference of our attack. Table 2 should be used to attack subkeys k 1, (4, 6, 9, 11) . Table 3 : we compute all (x 1 , y 3 , y 0 , x 2 ) with one of (u 0 , v 2 ), (u 1 , v 3 ), (u 2 , v 0 ), (u 3 , v 1 ) being zero and store them in table 3 
. There are 255 2 × 4 ≈ 2 18 elements in 3 , which are all possible values of x SB 2, (5, 7, 8, 10) satisfying the expected difference of our attack. Table 3 should be used to attack subkeys k 1, (5, 7, 8, 10) . Table 2 and table 3 should be used in the attack trail in the left part and the right part of Fig.3 respectively.
2) DATA COLLECTING PHASE 2 64 plaintexts are fixed at bytes 0, 1, 5, 6, 10, 11, 12, 15 and all possible values at rest bytes 2, 3, 4, 7, 8, 9, 13, 14 are guessed. The 2 64 plaintexts is called a structure. We take 2 n structures and data complexity would be 2 n+64 chosen plaintexts.
By the sieve method for plaintext pairs based on quick sort [9] , pairs whose ciphertext pairs have zero difference in all but four bytes 0, 7, 10, 13 can be sieved. For 2 n structures, 2 n ×[2 64 ×(2 64 −1)]÷2×2 −96 ≈ 2 n+31 pairs can be obtained. Store ciphertext pairs at four bytes 0, 7, 10, 13 and the corresponding plaintext pairs at eight bytes 2, 3, 4, 7, 8, 9, 13, 14 in table T 0 , which are indexed by the serial number of plaintext pairs (expressed in n+31 bits).
3) KEY RECOVERING PHASE
The key recovering phase can be summarized in the following steps. Through the early abort [11] , steps 1-3 sieve the pairs which satisfy the expected attack trail in the left part of Fig.3 step by step. Based on the two attack trails of Fig.3 , steps 4-5 reuse the plaintext pairs to discard wrong subkeys by the early abort technique for plaintext pairs [6] , the key schedule considerations and multiple impossible differentials.
Step 6 uses the master key recovering technique based on key schedule to reduce time complexity. Specifically, only ten subkey bytes (k 0, (5, 6, 10, 11, 12, 15) , k 1,(0,1,2,3) ) need to be guessed to obtain 192-bit master key, because the subkey byte k 0,(0) is determined by the two subkey bytes k 1,(5) and k 1, (8) , also k 0,(1) is determined by the two subkey bytes k 1, (6) and k 1, (9) . Furthermore, based on (k 0 , k 1,col(0,1) , k 7,(0,7,10,13) ), firstly attackers use key (k 0 , k 1,col(0,1) ) to compute k 7,(0,7,10,13) by the key schedule and the wrong guesses of master key which do not match the common four subkey bytes k 7,(0,7,10,13) are discarded. Then the remaining candidates can be tested by brute force.
All the twenty subkey bytes are used during the attacks to recover master key of AES-192, which also reduces the time complexity.
The specific steps are as follows: 1. Recover k 7,(0,7,10,13) . For each of the 2 n+31 ciphertext pairs in T 0 , the difference x SR 7,(0,7,10,13) = C (0,7,10,13) is known, so x SB 7,(0,1,2,3) can be calculated by the SR −1 operation. In addition, the 2 10 can be obtained by looking up table 1 . Based on ( x I 7,(0,1,2,3) , x SB 7,(0,1,2,3) ), accessing corresponding element in table 0 , 2 10 pairs of (x SR 7,(0,7,10,13) , x SR 7,(0,7,10,13) ) can be calculated by the SR −1 operation and k 7,(0,7,10,13) = x SR 7,(0,7,10,13) ⊕ C (0,7,10,13) can be derived. Thus 2 n+31 × 2 10 = 2 n+41 values of k 7,(0,7,10,13) can be obtained. We store the corresponding serial number of plaintext pairs in table T 1 indexed by k 7,(0,7,10,13) . There remains 2 n+41 ÷ 2 32 = 2 n+9 on average for each k 7,(0,7,10,13) .
2. For current k 7,(0,7,10,13) , we recover k 0, (3, 4, 9, 14) . For each of the 2 n+9 serial number in table T 1 , access table T 0 and the difference x AK 0, (3, 4, 9, 14) = P (3, 4, 9, 14) can be obtained. Guessing all the non-zero values of x MC 1,(4,6) , 2 16 values of x SB 1, (3, 4, 9, 14) can be calculated by the MC −1 and SR −1 operations since x MC 1,(5,7) = (0, 0). Based on ( P (3, 4, 9, 14) , x SB 1, (3, 4, 9, 14) ), access corresponding element in table 0 and 2 16 pairs of (x AK 0, (3, 4, 9, 14) , x AK 0, (3, 4, 9, 14) ) can be obtained. Then derive k 0, (3, 4, 9, 14) = x AK 0, (3, 4, 9, 14) ⊕ P (3, 4, 9, 14) . Thus 2 n+9 × 2 16 = 2 n+25 values of k 0, (3, 4, 9, 14) can be obtained. We store the corresponding serial number of plaintext pairs and (x MC 1,(4,6) , x MC 1, (4, 6) ) in table T 2 indexed by k 0, (3, 4, 9, 14) . There remains 2 n+25 ÷ 2 32 = 2 n−7 on average for each k 0, (3, 4, 9, 14) .
3. For current (k 0, (3, 4, 9, 14) , k 7,(0,7,10,13) ), we recover k 0, (2, 7, 8, 13) .
For each of the 2 n−7 the serial number in table T 2 , access table T 0 and obtain the difference x AK 0,(2,7,8,13) = P (2, 7, 8, 13) . Guessing all the non-zero values of x MC 1, (9, 11) , 2 16 values of x SB 1, (2, 7, 8, 13) can be calculated by the MC −1 and SR −1 operations since x MC 1, (8, 10) = (0, 0). Based on ( P (2,7,8,13 ) , x SB 1,(2,7,8,13) ), access corresponding element in table 0 and 2 16 pairs of (x AK 0, (2,7,8,13 ) , x AK 0, (2,7,8,13) ) can be obtained. Then derive k 0, (2, 7, 8, 13) = x AK 0, (2, 7, 8, 13) ⊕ P (2, 7, 8, 13) . Thus 2 n−7 × 2 16 = 2 n+9 values of k 0, (2, 7, 8, 13) can be obtained. We store the corresponding serial number of plaintext pairs and (x MC 1, (4, 6, 9, 11) , x MC 1, (4, 6, 9, 11) ) in table T 3 indexed by k 0, (2, 7, 8, 13) . There remains 2 n+9 ÷ 2 32 = 2 n−23 on average for each k 0, (2, 7, 8, 13) .
4. For current (k 0, (2, 3, 4, 7, 8, 9, 13, 14) , k 7,(0,7,10,13) ), we recover k 1, (4, 6, 9, 11) .
Construct table S 1 which has 2 24 addresses indexed by k 1, (4, 6, 9) . For each address, store 1 or 0 with initial value 0. We set a counter by variable flag 1 , whose initial value is 0. For each (x MC 1, (4, 6, 9, 11) , x MC 1, (4, 6, 9, 11) ) in table T 3 , 2 18 values of ( x MC 1, (4, 6, 9, 11) , x SB 2, (4, 6, 9, 11) ) can be obtained by looking up table 2 . Accessing corresponding element in table 0 , attackers can obtain 2 18 pairs of (x AK 1, (4, 6, 9, 11) , x AK 1, (4, 6, 9, 11) ) and derive k 1, (4, 6, 9, 11) MC 1, (4, 6, 9, 11) ⊕ x AK 1, (4, 6, 9, 11) . Since k 1,(11) = k 0,(3) ⊕ SB(k 1,(4) ) ⊕ a (where a is a constant), we discard subkeys k 1, (4, 6, 9, 11) which do not match the subkey byte k 1, (11) , and the number of remaining subkeys k 1, (4, 6, 9) is 2 18 × 2 −8 = 2 10 . Then check whether the value of S 1 at corresponding address of k 1, (4, 6, 9) is 0. If so, change the value to 1 and increase the value of flag 1 by 1. When flag 1 = 2 24 , judge that current subkey (k 0, (2, 3, 4, 7, 8, 9, 13, 14) , k 7,(0,7,10,13) ) is wrong. So there is no need to exhaust the remaining pairs, and attackers will directly check the next subkey (k 0, (2, 3, 4, 7, 8, 9, 13, 14) , k 7,(0,7,10,13) ). If flag 1 < 2 24 after testing all the remaining pairs in table T 3 , execute step 5. Note that the probability that a wrong subkey (k 0, (2, 3, 4, 7, 8, 9, 13, 14) , k 1, (4, 6, 9, 11) , k 7,(0,7,10,13) ) can be rejected is 1 − e −2 n−37 5. For current (k 0, (2, 3, 4, 7, 8, 9, 13, 14) , k 7,(0,7,10,13) ), we recover k 1, (5, 7, 8, 10) .
(5.1) Accessing the current k 7,(0,7,10,13) in table T 1 , 2 n+9 serial number of plaintext pairs can be obtained. Based on k 0, (2, 3, 4, 7, 8, 9, 13, 14) , we firstly use the current subkey k 0, (3, 4, 9, 14) to compute x SB 1, (3, 4, 9, 14) and then select the plaintext pairs which satisfy x MC 1, (4, 6) = 0 and x MC 1,(5,7) = 0. For the remaining 2 n+9 × 2 −16 = 2 n−7 pairs, use the current subkey k 0, (2, 7, 8, 13) to compute x SB 1, (2, 7, 8, 13) and then select the plaintext pairs which satisfy x MC 1,(9,11) = 0 and x MC 1, (8, 10) = 0. The number of remaining pairs is 2 n−7 × 2 −16 = 2 n−23 , and store the corresponding (x MC 1, (5, 7, 8, 10) , x MC 1, (5, 7, 8, 10) ) in table T 4 . (5.2) Construct table S 2 which has 2 24 addresses indexed by k 1, (5, 7, 8) . For each address, store 1 or 0 with initial value 0. We also set a counter by variable flag 2 , whose initial value is 0. For each (x MC 1, (5, 7, 8, 10) , x MC 1, (5, 7, 8, 10) ) in table T 4 , 2 18 values of ( x MC 1, (5, 7, 8, 10) , x SB 2, (5, 7, 8, 10) ) can be obtained by looking up table 3 . Accessing corresponding element in table 0 , we can obtain 2 18 pairs of (x AK 1, (5, 7, 8, 10) , x AK 1, (5, 7, 8, 10) ) and derive k 1,(5,7,8,10) = x MC 1,(5,7,8,10) ⊕ x AK 1, (5, 7, 8, 10) . Since k 1,(10) = k 0,(2) ⊕ SB(k 1, (7) ) ⊕ a(where a is a constant), we discard subkeys k 1, (5, 7, 8, 10) which do not match the subkey byte k 1, (10) , and the number of remaining subkeys k 1, (5, 7, 8) is 2 18 × 2 −8 = 2 10 . Then check whether the value of S 2 at corresponding address of k 1, (5, 7, 8) is 0. If so, change the value to 1 and increase the value of flag 2 by 1. When flag 2 = 2 24 , judge that current subkey (k 0, (2, 3, 4, 7, 8, 9, 13, 14) , k 7,(0,7,10,13) ) is wrong and then directly check the next subkey (k 0, (2, 3, 4, 7, 8, 9, 13, 14) , k 7,(0,7,10,13) ). If flag 2 < 2 24 after testing all the remaining pairs in table T 4 , search out all k 1,col (1, 2) with S 1 [k 1,(4,6,9) ] = 0 and S 1 [k 1, (5, 7, 8) ] = 0, and judge that corresponding subkeys (k 0, (2, 3, 4, 7, 8, 9, 13, 14) , k 1,col (1, 2) , k 7,(0,7,10,13) ) are candidates. Note that the probability that a wrong subkey (k 0, (2, 3, 4, 7, 8, 9, 13, 14) , k 1, (5, 7, 8, 10) , k 7,(0,7,10,13) ) can be rejected is 1 − e −2 n−37 6. Master key recovering phase. Based on key schedule algorithm of AES-192, the subkey byte k 0,(0) is determined by the two subkey bytes k 1, (5) and k 1,(8) , also k 0,(1) is determined by the two subkey bytes k 1, (6) and k 1, (9) . So only ten subkey bytes (k 0, (5, 6, 10, 11, 12, 15) , k 1,col(0) ) need to be guessed, and 192-bit master keys (k 0 , k 1,col(0,1) ) can be obtained. We compute corresponding k 7,(0,7,10,13) by using key schedule and discard the subkeys (k 0 , k 1,col(0,1) , k 7,(0,7,10,13) ) which do not match the common four subkey bytes k 7,(0,7,10,13) . The rest of candidates can be tested by brute force to obtain the right master key.
B. COMPLEXITY ANALYSIS
The complexity of precomputation phase can be neglected compared with the complexity of key recovering phase. Data collecting phase needs 2 n ×2 64 log 2 2 64 = 2 n+70 comparisons and 2 n+31 × 2 × (4 + 8) = 2 n+34 × 3 bytes of memory. The complexities of key recovering phase are as follows:
In step 1, the time complexity is 2 n+31 × 2 10 = 2 n+41 lookups, and the memory demands 2 32 ×2 n+9 ×(n+31)/8 = 2 n+38 × (n + 31) bytes. In step 2, the time complexity is 2 32 × 2 n+9 × 2 16 = 2 n+57 lookups, and the memory demands 2 n+25 × (4 + (n + 31)/8) bytes.
In step 3, the time complexity is 2 64 × 2 n−7 × 2 16 = 2 n+73 lookups, and the memory demands 2 n+9 × (8 + (n + 31)/8) bytes.
In step 4, each wrong subkey can pass the test of a pair with a probability 1 − 2 −14 , and the probability that a wrong subkey can pass the test of D = 2 n−23 pairs is (1 − 2 −14 ) 2 n−23 ≈ e −2 n−37 , so the probability that all the 3-byte subkeys k 1, (4, 6, 9) cannot pass the test of D = 2 n−23 pairs is [1 − (1 − 2 −14 ) 2 n−23 ] 2 24 ≈ e −2 24−1.4425×2 n−37 . Thus the probability that a wrong subkey can pass the test of d = 2 14 D pairs while rejecting the test of d = 2 14 (D + 1) pairs is p d = e −2 24−1.4425(d+1) − e −2 24 Note that there is no need to check whether 2 n−23 plaintext-ciphertext pairs satisfy the differential path in step 4. The subkey does not need to be tested by all 2 n−23 pairs. The mathematical expectation of the remaining pairs is 2 14 × 2 4.1 . In other words, for the current subkey (k 0, (2, 3, 4, 7, 8, 9, 13, 14) , k 7,(0,7,10,13) ), it takes 2 14 × 2 4.1 remaining pairs on average to reject all 2 24 wrong subkeys k 1, (4, 6, 9) . When all 2 24 subkeys k 1, (4, 6, 9) are rejected, attackers can judge that the current subkey (k 0, (2, 3, 4, 7, 8, 9, 13, 14) , k 7,(0,7,10,13) ) is wrong.
Because the probability that the wrong subkey (k 0, (2, 3, 4, 7, 8, 9, 13, 14) , k 7,(0,7,10,13) ) can pass the test of step 4 is p = 1 − e −2 24 × 2 80 . Based on the 192-bit candidates (k 0 , k 1,col(0,1) ), we firstly compute k 7,(0) and k 7,(7) by 16 lookups of S-box respectively, then discard the candidates that do not match the common 2-byte subkey k 7,(0,7) . Secondly, we compute k 7,(10) and k 7,(13) by 20 lookups of S-box to sieve candidates. The time complexity of this procedure is t 1 = ξ ×16+2 −8 ×ξ ×16+2 −16 ×ξ ×20+2 −24 ×ξ × 20 ≈ 2 4 ×ξ lookups, and the time complexity of exhaustively search is t 2 = 2 −32 × ξ 7-round AES encryption. So the time complexity of step 6 is t 1 + t 2 ≈ t 1 .
The complexities of step 1-6 are shown in table III. We take n = 2 42.3 , and the time complexities of step 1-3 are 2 83.3 , 2 99.3 and 2 115.3 lookups respectively. The probability that the subkey (k 0, (2, 3, 4, 7, 8, 9, 13, 14) , k 7,(0,7,10,13) ) can pass the test of step 4 is p = 1 − e −2 24−1.4425×2 n−37 ≈ 2 −32.8 , so the time complexities of step 5.1 and 5.2 are 2 n+92 p = 2 101.5 and 2 114.1 p = 2 81.3 lookups. Then the number of candidates is ξ = 2 110.3 , so the time complexity of step 6 is ξ × 2 4 = 2 114.3 lookups. Note that if the value of n is smaller than 2 42.3 , the time complexity of step 6 will exceed the sum of the time complexity of step 1-5. If the value of n is bigger than 2 42.3 , the time complexity of step 3 will be bigger, and the total complexity also will grow. When n = 2 42.3 , our attack can get the improved result.
To sum up, our attack needs 2 n+64 = 2 106.3 chosen plaintexts. The time complexity is decided by data collecting phase and step 3, step 4 and step 6 of key recovering phase.
Paper [12] states that one round of AES may be implemented by 20 lookups, so the time complexity of our attack is (2 112.3 + 2 115.3 + 2 114.1 + 2 114.3 )/(7 × 20) ≈ 2 109.2 7-round AES encryptions. The memory complexity is dominated by step 1, which demands 2 n+38 × (n + 31) = 2 86.5 bytes.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, based on the new optimum combination of two impossible differentials attack trails with the same plaintext and ciphertext difference structure, we present a multiple impossible cryptanalysis on AES-192. Our attack can guess less subkey bytes than before and reuse the plaintext pairs to sieve the subkeys, so the data complexity can be reduced. Furthermore, using various new additional techniques, such as the master key recovering technique based on key schedule algorithm, the sieve method for plaintext pairs based on quick sort, and new early abort technique, we obtain the best result so far in terms of time complexity for impossible differential cryptanalysis of AES-192. 
